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Abstract 
 
Our paper analyzes the interplay of organizational demography with the propensity to adopt 
an innovative practice. In particular, we examine how the demographical composition of pro-
fessional German football teams influenced the adoption of the chain-defense-system (“Vier-
erkette”) as well as the success of implementing this system. In doing so we strongly believe 
that the underlying relationship between organizational demography and the innovation dif-
fusion process is not only relevant for football teams: Other smaller organizations or profit 
centers whose team structures seem comparable to those of football teams might be subject to 
similar processes.  
We hypothesize that a high level of team heterogeneity leads to a greater propensity to 
change. We also hypothesize that homogeneous teams are more successful in executing a new 
practice once they have overcome their skepticism. Our results support the hypotheses on 
change, but do not provide final support for our hypothesis on performance. 
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1 Introduction 
Most of the ongoing discussion on institutional change is either related to the implementation 
of institutionalized structural elements (e.g. Dobbin et al. 1993), the consequences of imple-
mentation (e.g. Ruef and Scott 1998) or the changes in an institutional field (e.g. Scott et al. 
2000). Studies on how and why organizational change in response to institutional pressure is 
impeded or promoted by organizational members are very rare, although Lynne Zucker 
(1977) offered a seminal contribution to this topic at the time when the neo-institutionalist ap-
proach was developed. However, this stream of research – the so called Micro-Institutional-
ism – has not found many successors (for an exception see e.g. Mühl 1998).  
Even though our paper does not follow the original track of micro-institutionalism, which 
concentrated on shared beliefs and norms in an organization and its influence on the insti-
tutionalization and taken-for-grantedness of organizational routines, we think that we can 
offer a new perspective on the internal organizational contingencies of institutional change. 
The general goal of this study is to analyze the interplay of organizational demography 
(Williams and O’Reilly 1998; Guzzo and Dickson 1996; Pfeffer 1983) and the propensity to 
adopt a practice which has been considered rational in the environment of the focal organi-
zation. In particular, we want to examine how the demographical composition of German 
Bundesliga (the German premier league, i.e. the highest division of professional football in 
Germany) football teams influenced the adoption of the chain-defense system (“Viererkette”) 
and the success of implementing this system.  
 
This study extends prior research on organizational demography and institutional isomor-
phism basically on two different dimensions. Firstly, we contribute to the vital discussion as 
to whether team heterogeneity is beneficial or harmful to organizations by clearly distinguish-
ing between different effects of heterogeneity. In accordance with a great number of other 
studies (e.g Goodstein and Boeker 1991; Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Boeker 1997) we hypo-
thesize that a high level of team heterogeneity leads to a greater susceptibility to innovation – 
thus to a greater propensity to change. However, in contrast to many other studies which do 
not discuss the consequences of implementation of an innovative organizational practice for 
different degrees of team heterogeneity we also hypothesize that homogeneous teams are 
more successful in executing a new practice once they have overcome their skepticism to-
wards the practice and have implemented it.    2 
Secondly, this study on the adoption and the consequences of the chain system on German 
football teams allows us to almost unambiguously identify institutional change. As we will 
show below in more detail, the diffusion of this defense system was triggered by distinct insti-
tutional processes. Hence, the great advantage of the data which we use lies in the fact that for 
each club the individual applications of the chain system and their specific variations are 
clearly documented. Instead of relying on announcements or uncertain self-reports of firms, 
the documented observation of the Bundesliga matches leaves no doubt whether the teams 
have applied this practice or not. Moreover, the success of the football teams and thus the 
consequences of adoption can also be observed univocally, since this observation only 
requires the registration of the results of the matches.  
 
2  Literature: Football Teams as a Field of Inquiry for Economic Research 
The literature about the economics of team sports has been steadily increasing since the mid-
1950s. Seminal contributions to this strand of literature are from Rottenberg (1956), Grusky 
(1963), Neale (1964), and Jones (1969). However, as this branch of research originated in the 
US, most of its publications still focus on the popular American forms of team sport (for a re-
view see Fort and Quirk 1995). European football, which had been introduced to the academic 
community by Moroney (1956), Reep et al. (1971) and Sloane (1971), did not really seem to 
attract researchers until the late 1990s. This reluctance might be explained by the fact that the 
organizational structures of European football leagues had been predominantly inspired by the 
traditional ideals of honorary sport clubs. Thus, football leagues and teams have not been 
considered a worthwhile field of economic and organizational research. Yet, at least in the 
case of the big four European leagues (Spain, Italy, England and Germany), the 1990s saw an 
immense increase in the demand for television broadcasting rights, rising gate revenues and 
exponential growth rates of players’ salaries which unavoidably induced sustained structural 
change in the form of increasing commercialization dynamics. With respect to total turnovers, 
the top fourteen European clubs of the 1999/2000 season all stemmed from one of these four 
countries and eight of them being quoted on the stock exchange (Süßmilch et al. 2002). 
Professional football therefore represents a remarkably developing branch of the prospering 
sport business today. For example in Germany the 2001/2002 average revenues of clubs in the 
Bundesliga amounted to more than 62 million € (DFL 2002).    3 
Thus, two driving forces which stimulated recent research interests in professional football 
can be identified:
  
•   The growing economic impact of the football industry due to the spectacular 
increase in the demand for football over the last decade.
 For example, in the 
German Bundesliga the number of total stadium attendants rose from about 6.3 
million in 1990/1991 to approximately 9.5 million in 2001/2002. This develop-
ment uncovered questions in the economics of football which had just not been 
appreciated before. 
•   The grown awareness of sport teams as economic subjects which operate with 
identical production functions and compete against each other in an almost 
identical environment. Hence, given the fact that a unique variety of individual 
football data has been made available in recent years, an empirical analysis of 
these observations offers an exclusive opportunity for a disaggregated inquiry 
of organizational theories. 
This increased attention towards football as a field of economic and organizational research is 
accompanied by the ease of use of unique data sets on football organizations. “A major at-
traction of sports to empirical economists, indeed, is that the availability of data permits in-
vestigation of a large number of economic propositions that would be difficult to test in other 
areas, because of a lack of suitable data. The professional football sector therefore offers op-
portunities for empirical research in areas such as consumer behaviour, labour economics 
and industrial organization [...]” (Dobson and Godard 2001, XVI).  
 
Consequently, economic and organizational publications on football consider various aspects 
of this topic (for an ample overview of studies on football see Dobson and Goddard 2001): 
Ridder, Cramer and Hopstaken (1994) quantified the effects of a red card based on the results 
of 340 matches of the professional Dutch football division. OLS estimates of the home 
ground advantages of English football clubs have been presented by Clarke and Normann 
(1995). Estimates of job-departure hazard functions for English football managers were given 
by Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999). Koning (2000) analyzed the ‘balance in competition’ 
in Dutch football. Recently, Szymanski and Smith (2002) considered this topic with respect to 
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and English top division football leagues whereas the effects of 
firing a coach on team performance have been studied, i.a. by Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel 
(2003) or Koning (2003) for the case of the Netherlands.   4 
So far, data on the German Bundesliga has stimulated an astonishingly small amount of 
empiric research. As a matter of fact, German researchers seem to have discovered the wide-
area of football econometrics only very recently. For example Swieter (2002) conducted an 
economic analysis of the German Bundesliga. Kern and Süssmuth (2003) presented a statisti-
cal analysis of coach efficiency in German football, drawing heavily on Dawson et al. (2000) 
while Sutter and Kocher (2004) analyzed the alleged home bias of referees. The introduction 
of new defense systems or other major changes in a football team’s strategy have – to the best 
of our knowledge – not been subjects of empirical studies so far. Moreover, studies on the 
demographical composition of sport teams are still very rare (but see e.g. Timmerman 2000). 
 
3  Case Study: The Institutionalization of the Chain-Defense System 
Football is the most popular sport in Germany. It attracts by far the greatest audiences and is 
the only sport where matches are attended regularly by more than 30,000 people in cities all 
over Germany. Other popular sports like ice-hockey, handball or basketball have much 
smaller audiences. The media coverage of football is more ample and intense than of any 
other sport. For example the two most popular sports magazines, “kicker” and “Sport Bild” 
devote the vast majority of the content of each volume to the coverage of football matches 
and to background stories concerning football. Television coverage is also amazing. Each 
Bundesliga match is shown live – on pay TV – and in shortened recorded versions several 
times on a variety of channels each weekend. Since the introduction of the NFL-Europe, in 
few specific German cities matches of American football are attended by audiences which – 
in terms of size – come close to those of football audiences. However, there are only four 
NFL Europe-clubs in Germany and the media coverage of American football is not even rudi-
mentarily comparable to the coverage of football. 
Thus, the Bundesliga clubs can be considered as the most important profit organizations in the 
German sports entertainment industry. Interestingly, the revenues of these organizations de-
pend to an increasing extent on merchandising and, even more importantly, on the fees that 
TV stations pay for broadcasting matches and to a decreasing extent on ticket sales. However, 
this development should not lead to the impression that the actual playing of football has lost 
importance for Bundesliga clubs. On the contrary: Qualification for the European club com-
petitions, for example, guarantees the assignment of enormous amounts of money from the 
broadcasting fees to the clubs.    5 
However, in Germany only the top five clubs in the final end of season ranking as well as the 
winner of the German cup final directly qualify either for the champions league (the top two 
clubs) or the UEFA Cup (the next three clubs and the German cup-winner). Moreover, the last 
three clubs in the final ranking of a season are relegated to the second German football league, 
where they have to play against less attractive opponents and receive a lot less money for the 
broadcasting of league matches. As a consequence, the ability to outperform rivals on the 
playground is vital for the economic well-being of any German Bundesliga club. 
 
Therefore it can be stated that the basic “product” of German football clubs on which their 
economic success depends still is the playing of football matches. And the “core technology” 
of football clubs is the tactics a team uses in order to beat an opponent. Nonetheless, it is not 
the case that each football team plays with totally different tactics. Most teams play with a 
similar organization of defense, mid-field and offensive. For decades team coaches sought 
competitive advantages over other teams, not by introducing revolutionary new playing sys-
tems, but by making small variations to well known practices. However, in the early 1990s 
the beginning of a new era in football tactics was witnessed. A new defense system was de-
veloped and adopted by famous European and South American clubs and national teams. This 
system was the so called four-link-chain. Also a variation of that system – the three-link-chain  
(“Dreierkette”)– emerged at the beginning of 1990s.  
 
The basic idea of the chain system is inspired by the aim of active field dominance. In the tra-
ditional “Libero”-system, defense players were forced to interpret their role in a passive man-
ner: Blocking passes to and kicks by the antagonistic strikers, each of the defenders had to 
follow his individual opponent. This kind of football might prevent rival teams from scoring 
any goals, yet, it surely does not support an offensive game in which the defense players also 
initialize own attacks.  
A chain system, on the other hand, liberates the defense players from this kind of personal 
marking: The defenders are now responsible for a certain area on the playing field so they do 
not have to stick to their individual opponents over the whole playing time. Instead, they have 
to interact much closer with their own midfield partners. This, together with an extensive 
usage of the offside-rule, allows a much greater variability for own offensive actions. Conse-
quently, successful implementation of the chain-link-system should be attractive to those 
teams which really do strive for a win.    6 
German teams, indeed, were reluctant to adopt this new practice. One reason for the skepti-
cism of German football clubs might have been that the previous defense system, where only 
the head of the defense (the Libero) had no direct opponent, was developed in Germany. A 
vital role in the creation of the position of the Libero in the early 1970s was played by Franz 
Beckenbauer who is to date the most successful and most admired German football player. 
Manfred Kaltz, Lothar Matthäus and Matthias Sammer are other very famous agents of Ger-
man football who played the role of the Libero with elegance and creativity.  
Since the introduction of the chain system means to abolish the position of the Libero and 
given that German football was tremendously successful from the 1970s until the early 1990s 
with this form of defense, it is hardly surprising that German football teams stuck for a long 
time with the traditional system of defense. In the 1993/1994 season of Bundesliga football, 
Erich Ribbeck, the coach of Bayern München, tried to install the chain system for a longer 
period. However after a couple of matches he was told by Franz Beckenbauer, now the CEO 
of Bayern München, to return to the old system, since Beckenbauer was convinced that the 
new defense system reduced the success of the team. 
 
However, the situation changed in the mid 1990s when the German national team dropped out 
of the 1994 World Cup in the quarter finals (against Bulgaria!). This was considered a 
national disaster by the sports press. Now, a vigorous discussion on whether German football 
was still competitive began and attention towards the new defense system increased. The re-
porting on the advantages of the chain system grew and more and more coaches let their 
teams play the new system. Most of them were still experimenting, thus they often returned to 
the Libero-system after a couple of matches played with the chain system. But over time the 
chain system prevailed.  
Nowadays the diffusion of the chain system appears completed. Almost every Bundesliga 
team is playing either with a four-link- or a three-link-chain-defense system at each match. 
Hence, it is justified to say that the chain system is now taken for granted and the institu-
tionalization of this practice which belongs to the core technology of football organizations 
has finally reached German football – a laggard with respect to the implementation of the new 
defense system. 
   7 
4  Hypotheses: Team Heterogeneity and Subgroup Strength in the Diffusion Process 
It is common sense that the success of football teams relies to a great extent on the ability of 
their members to cooperate effectively. The mutual understanding and anticipation of the 
team members’ moves is a decisive resource for effective team play. Thus, the development 
of a common perspective on the team’s actions – the building of a “cohort” (Gibson and Ver-
meulen 2003) – is of extreme importance for the strength of a team. Moreover, successful 
changes in the team’s practices require the common acceptance of the team members. In this 
respect, football teams are not different from other organizational teams. It only might be the 
case that these preconditions of a group’s success and organizational change are more ac-
centuated in sport teams than in other organizational groups.  
 
Among analysts of team processes, there exists great consensus over the assumption that the 
development of common perspectives and innovativeness among team members is strongly 
dependent on the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the team members’ demographical at-
tributes. Therefore, we claim that besides the effect of the overall institutionalization of the 
chain-defense system, the adoption of this practice by German Bundesliga clubs is also deter-
mined by aspects of team heterogeneity and demographical attributes of team members. 
Moreover, we also claim that a successful implementation of this new defense system is also 
influenced by demographical variables. 
 
In an integrating attempt to describe the importance of organizational demography for group 
formation, Williams and O’Reilly (1998) relate group processes and the outcomes of these 
processes to three different sociological concepts, namely social categorization, the 
similarity/attraction paradigm and information and decision making processes. While theories 
of social categorization and the similarity/attraction paradigm underscore that people have the 
need to identify themselves as belonging to a group of similar others and that similarity in 
attributes furthers satisfying interaction among group members, theories on information and 
decision-making point out that heterogeneous groups have stronger access to information and 
knowledge from external networks (see also Tsui et al. 1992). Since heterogeneity in teams 
leads to integration problems and unsatisfactory communication processes, members of such 
heterogeneous teams are inclined to seek communication with agents in the external environ-
ment to whom they are more similar than to their team colleagues.   8 
With respect to group processes, homogeneity within teams should lead to greater content-
ment of team members and to an intensified and positively reinforced process of communi-
cation among members which should result in collective norms and perceptions. A couple of 
empirical studies support these considerations. For example, Chatman and Flynn (2001) 
found that heterogeneity early in the existence of groups has a negative effect on the 
perception of corporate norms while Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) showed that 
interpersonal diversity of team members’ dominant work experiences lowers the amount of 
information sharing in teams. O’Reilly et al. (1989) found that homogeneity of groups leads 
to higher levels of social integration. As a consequence, turnover rates of employees increased 
with group heterogeneity, a result which was also found by Wagner et al. (1984). Strong 
contact and intensive communication between team members also leads to an amplified 
development of routines (Wiersema and Bantel 1992) which brings about an easier and 
quicker handling of procedures and a more secure execution of tasks as the learning curve 
literature proves (e.g. Yelle 1979).  
 
However, a further effect of strong routinization is a greater propensity to overlook alter-
native, probably more suitable solutions to current problems because of improved competen-
cies with prior solutions (Levitt and March 1988) and thus the development of inertia (Han-
nan and Freeman 1984) and resistance to change (Tushman and Romanelli 1985). Therefore, 
the limitation of within-group interaction and information sharing due to heterogeneous group 
composition should be accompanied with greater access to (innovative) information from 
outside and a greater variety of the group members’ skills since the members’ activities are 
not so strongly limited to certain routines. Moreover, the lower level of routinization in hete-
rogeneous groups should also lead to a greater openness to innovations and a greater propen-
sity to engage in organizational change. In accordance with these considerations it was found 
in various studies that heterogeneity in top management teams was associated with higher 
rates of strategic change or innovativeness (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Boeker 1997; Good-
stein and Boeker 1991; Hambrick et al. 1996; Bantel and Jackson 1989; but see Goodstein et 
al. 1994).  
   9 
With respect to the spread of the chain system, it seems unlikely that homogeneous teams had 
limited access to information about this innovative element of team tactics since the media re-
ported extensively about the new system. Thus, each professional football player and each 
team coach – the person who is responsible for determining a team’s tactics – should have 
been able to come into contact with this new kind of defense organization.  
 
Routinization processes, on the other hand, are especially prevalent in team sports. As already 
mentioned, the ability to execute certain collective moves or to perform special tricks (e.g. at 
a free kick) requires a lot of collective practice where team members communicate with each 
other and learn to adjust to other team members’ actions. As a result, collective moves should 
be performed easier and without a lot of cognitive activity of each team player (Simon 1960). 
Football teams therefore try to routinize the complex collective actions on the pitch. 
Homogeneity among team members should support this routinization process through a 
higher level of communication and information sharing at practice sessions. Since the 
introduction of an innovative playing system destroys the developed routines and the 
competitive advantages that were linked to them, neither the team members nor the coaches of 
teams with highly routinized playing capabilities should be especially keen to adopt such a 
practice.  
In contrast, heterogeneous teams should not have developed the same amount of routines and 
should therefore be more open to innovative practices which are receiving increasing popular-
ity through institutionalization processes. Accordingly, heterogeneous teams should be more 
inclined to install a playing system which is considered as the new way of efficient football 
playing.  
 
As a result, we expect that during the diffusion process of the chain system, more homogene-
ous and therefore (supposedly) more routinized teams have a lower propensity to change from 
the traditional defense system to the chain system. We hypothesize: 
H1: The rate of adoption of the chain-defense system increases with team 
heterogeneity.   10 
Team composition is not only characterized by the level of heterogeneity within the team but 
also by a team’s tendency to build distinct fractions which differ from each other. This poten-
tial of fraction building is covered by the concept of subgroup strength (Gibson and Ver-
meulen 2003). This concept accounts for the fact that some team members may be very sim-
ilar to a certain subgroup of the team on a variety of traits and very dissimilar to another sub-
group of the team. Such a constellation results only in medium heterogeneity but in strong 
subgroup strength. One can expect that a high level of subgroup strength leads to a strong 
homogeneity and an increased interaction within a subgroup. The increased interaction of 
subgroup members, on and off the pitch, should enhance the similarity of the subgroup 
members’ attitudes. Since resistance to change is a normal reaction of organizational 
members when innovations are planned (Kieser et al. 1998) increased subgroup strength 
should therefore lead to a more collective resistance against an innovation within the 
subgroup. Thus, the higher the subgroup strength within a team the more powerful the 
different subgroups should be in their ability to prevent an innovation from being 
implemented. We therefore hypothesize:  
H2: The rate of adoption of the chain-defense system decreases with sub group 
strength. 
 
However, as Tolbert and Zucker (1983) point out, the effects of certain organizational attri-
butes on the adoption of institutionalized practices should be stronger at the beginning of an 
institutionalization process. At this time organizations with certain organizational characteris-
tics are more likely to adopt the new practice than other organizations because adoption seems 
rational for organizations with these characteristics.  
As the institutionalization process moves on, pressures to adopt a practice which is considered 
rational in the environment of an organization increase and organizations are forced to adopt 
an institutionalized practice, no matter whether their characteristics are adequate for it or not. 
During the observation period of our study almost all Bundesliga teams switched to the chain-
defense system. Therefore we expect that the influences of team heterogeneity and subgroup 
strength on the adoption rate should diminish over time since institutionalization pressures 
increasingly force reluctant teams, i.e. teams with high levels of homogeneity or subgroup 
strength, to take over the chain system. We state: 
H3a: The positive effect of team heterogeneity on the adoption rate reduces with time. 
H3b: The negative effect of subgroup strength on the adoption rate reduces with time.   11 
Since the tendency to retain a certain playing system should be higher the more this system 
has been engraved in the team members’ movements and since such an engraving can only be 
accomplished by a routinization process, heterogeneous teams in general should have lower 
difficulties to switch between playing systems. Thus, the higher amount of volatility of 
heterogeneous teams should make them also more prone to play with the old Libero system 
again, e.g. if the team is not satisfied with the new system or if the coach thinks that a certain 
opponent is better faced with the old defense system. Therefore, we state: 
H4: The rate of returning to the Libero system increases with team heterogeneity. 
 
Consequently, the higher within group homogeneity in teams with high levels of subgroup 
strength should lead to a higher tendency to stick to the new playing system, once it has been 
introduced. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H5: The rate of returning to the Libero system decreases with subgroup strength. 
 
Since the hypothesized effects of heterogeneity and subgroup strength on the rate of returning 
to the Libero system are caused by different degrees of volatility and not by an institutional 
process, these effects should also be independent of time. 
 
The consequences of organizational change and adaptation to institutional expectations on 
organizational performance have been extensively explored (Barnett and Carroll 1995; 
Walgenbach 2002). Also the effects of heterogeneity on team performance have attracted a lot 
of attention from researchers (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). However, there is a dearth of re-
search into the question of whether heterogeneity or homogeneity of teams is helpful in im-
plementing organizational change successfully. We now want to address this research 
question by arguing that a greater propensity of heterogeneous teams to take over innovations 
does not necessarily mean that these teams are also more successful in executing a new 
practice. On the contrary: There are good reasons to suppose that heterogeneity in teams leads 
to disadvantages in the exertion of innovations. The transition to a new system of collective 
action requires a lot of communication and interaction among team members. The collective 
acquisition of a new team practice, the adjustment of collective actions and the development 
of correct reactions to individual actions can only be achieved when the team members com-
municate intensively with each other. Since communication and information sharing is limited   12 
in heterogeneous teams, the members of these teams should find it difficult to become ac-
quainted with a system with which they have no prior experience. Thus, the very processes 
which make heterogeneous teams more prone to innovations should work as a constraint in 
the successful execution of these innovations. Since the level of communication and inter-
action is higher in homogeneous teams these teams should find it easier to perform a new 
team practice once they have overcome their resistance to change and have adopted the inno-
vation. Therefore we hypothesize: 
H6: The performance consequences of the adoption of the chain system are worse for 
heterogeneous teams than for homogeneous teams. 
 
We do not set up a hypothesis concerning the chain system’s performance consequences of 
teams with a high level of subgroup strength because these consequences should be mixed. 
Positive consequences of within subgroup homogeneity should be offset by negative conse-
quences of between subgroup heterogeneity. 
 
5 Empirical  Study 
Our empirical study is based on a comprehensive dataset covering 11 Bundesliga seasons 
from August 1992 to May 2003. Each championship was contested by 18 different teams of 
which facing the others twice (once at home and once away). Consequently, a total of 306 
matches per season were observed, giving a total of 3366 Bundesliga matches over 11 sea-
sons. Due to the end-of-season relegation system which replaces the 3 worst performing 
teams by the 3 best performing teams of the lower division (Second Bundesliga), these 3366 
matches were carried out by a total of 32 different football clubs which joined the first 
division within this 11 years period. For each match, a complete record of sports statistics has 
been provided by “Sport-Dienst-Agentur Merk”, a commercial service agency which offers a 
wide variety of football data. Together with standard information about, i.a. match dates, 
match results, scorers and player substitutions, these statistics offer remarkable insights into 
the organizational demography of the analyzed teams. For each player brought into action 
during any match and for every participating coach the following characteristics have been re-
corded: Date of birth, nationality, curriculum vitae (signed Bundesliga-contracts), previous 
experience on the job (amount of participated Bundesliga matches) as well as previous suc-
cesses on the job (titles won in the Bundesliga, in the German and European cup compe-
titions).    13 
Historical Bundesliga data for the chain system-adoption process have not been available until 
now. Therefore, additional sources of information had to be integrated into our dataset. 
Stylized playing-schemes have been routinely presented by the “kicker” magazine over the 
whole obersavation sample. However, these informations were not available in an electronic 
format, so we restricted our usage of kicker information to the first three years of our sample 
(kicker 1992-1995). Thereafter, beginning with the 1995/1996 season, we rely on playing 
schemes presented by the “digital tainment pool” on their commercially distributed 
“Freistoss” CD (digital tainment 2004). Based on these sources, we have been able to 
construct a cross section time series data set which traces the German chain system adoption 
process. The initial data set for the analysis of the adoption of the chain system consisted of 
each match since 1992 for each team, i.e. each match was considered twice in the data. 
However, we had to constrict this data set for several reasons discussed below.  
 
5.1  Empirical Study: Methods 
In order to test the hypotheses on the adoption of the chain system we estimated continuous 
time event history models (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002). Thus, we estimated the “risk” of a 
team switching from the Libero system to the chain system. We did not distinguish between a 
four-link and a three-link-chain, but combined both into one single category. Since teams ex-
perienced this transition several times (teams often returned to the Libero system after they 
had adopted the chain system and then switched again to the chain system) we estimated 
multi-episode models. In these models the duration clock began to “tick” at the time the team 
appeared in the Bundesliga for the first time during the observation period. The clock was re-
set to zero each time a team returned to the Libero system. Thus, with the return to the Libero 
system a new episode began. The duration times ended when the teams switched to the chain 
system. Duration time was measured in number of matches minus one so that duration time 
began with zero. As the data consisted of all matches since 1992 for each team, this procedure 
required to take off all matches after a transition in which the teams continuously applied the 
chain system without interruption. When an interruption in the application of the chain system 
did occur, the transition process started anew.  
Each club was only observed until it had to relegate for the first time. If a club did not relegate 
during the observation period (only seven clubs) we could use all matches in which these 
clubs took part. Thus, the final data set for the adoption analysis consisted of 3554 matches in 
which 31 Bundesliga teams experienced 373 transitions from the Libero system to the chain   14 
system. One team had to be dropped from the analysis because this team applied the chain 
system in all of the observed matches.  
 
The analysis of the risk of returning from the chain system back to the Libero system was also 
undertaken with event history models. For this transition we used the reversed construction of 
the data set. Hence, all observations in which the teams continuously applied the Libero 
system after a transition from the chain system to the Libero system took place, had to be 
taken off the data. This resulted in a data set which consisted of 2687 matches of 24 Bundes-
liga teams. 360 transitions from the chain system to the Libero system occurred. The obser-
vations of eight teams had to be dropped since they applied the Libero system in all of the 
observed matches. 
For both transitions we estimated exponential models and took duration time (t) as a 
covariate. Hence, the models had the following form:  
() ( ) x t t r γ β α ′ + + = exp  
where α  denotes the constant and x stands for a vector of time varying covariates, among 
them team heterogeneity. This model approximates a Gompertz model (Blossfeld and Rohwer 
2002). In the results section we will present the effects on the natural logarithm of the hazard 
rate r(t). 
 
It should be noticed that for our performance analyzes the above-mentioned restrictions do 
not apply. We are therefore able to present performance measures based on 3366 observed 
match results between the 1992/1993- and the 2003/2003-season. Stylized facts of these 
match outcomes have been visualized by the empirical distribution of the goal difference, de-
fined as goals scored by the home team minus goals scored by the away team in Figure 1. The 
resulting histogram depicts three major issues which have to be regarded by our modeling ap-
proach: The discrete scale of the success measure, a significant home advantage (48.28% of 
the home teams won their matches whereas 27.09% of all encounters ended with a draw) and 
the high degree of randomness in football results (57.90% of all matches resulted in an ab-
solute value of the goal difference less than two).  
------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------   15 
In the last 50 years, all of these issues have already been discussed by sports economists (to 
our knowledge, Moroney (1956) presented one of the earliest attempts to model football 
results). Thus, we consulted the so-called “Balance in Competition” literature (see, e.g., Dob-
son and Goddard 2001, chapter 3, and the references therein) in our search for a suitable 
modeling framework. Finally, we decided to follow the suggestion of Koning (2000) who as-
sumes the outcome (home loss, draw or home win) of an arbitrary match in an 18-team league  
as being determined by a latent random variable Dij
* for which holds: 
j i j i N D ij ij j i ij ≠ = + − = , 18 , 1 , ), 1 , 0 ( ~ ,
* K ε ε α α . 
 
In the context of our research plan this specification represents some major advantages: First, 
with all of the individual characteristics of a team being captured by the strength parameter α  
(Strength of the home team:  i α  , strength of the away team:  j α ), our baseline performance 
models appear as parsimonious as possible. Second, the introduction of additional vectors of 
covariates i x and j x  straightforwardly generalizes this approach to account for the additional 
impacts of team specific variables (see also Koning 2003, who resembles this approach to 
account for the effects of firing a coach). Furthermore, from a methodological point of view, 
the latent variable specification seems to provide a preferable framework as it explicitly 
accounts for the categorical character of our dependent variable and the high degree of ran-
domness in football results: Under the assumption that an observed match result ij D can be at-
tributed to the latent difference in strength as 





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≤ <
≤
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ij
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D  , 
with  1 = ij D  if the home team loses,  2 = ij D  in case of a draw and  3 = ij D if the home team 
wins, we obtain a well defined ordered probit model which can be estimated by standard 
maximum likelihood procedures.  
 
It should be noted however that it is not possible to identify all model parameters. Each indi-
vidual strength coefficient α  can be formally interpreted as team specific fixed effect esti-
mator. Hence, some additional standardization is required: Dropping one club from our re-
gressor list, the remaining α  parameters may be estimated by the help of adequately defined   16 
dummy variables. As a result, we receive relative performance measures, with positive α  
parameters corresponding to a superior performance compared to the omitted “scaling” club.  
 
Our model can now be understood as follows: Consider a match between two hypothetical 
teams i, j (with i denoting to the home team) of equal strength (i.e.  j i α α = ). With given limit 
points  1 c  and  2 c , the final result  ij D  then has to be determined by mere chance as 
ij ij j i ij D ε ε α α = + − =
* . Note, that the aforementioned home effect is now obviously linked to 
the limit points: Given the distributional assumptions about  ij ε , a limit point constellation of 
2 1 c c − =  would assign equal probabilities to  1 = ij D  (home loss) and 3 = ij D (home win). 
Hence, a statistical significant home effect has to imply  2 1 c c − ≠ . To test this hypothesis, we 
derived an overall ranking of the German Bundesliga clubs 1993-2003 (Table 1 in the ap-
pendix) by estimating the model over the whole sample period.
1 As can be seen from the last 
two rows of Table 1, the hypothesis  2 1 c c − =  indeed has to be rejected at any usual signifi-
cance level. Furthermore, our estimates of the home effect in German football are astonishing 
close to Koning (2000), who reports limit points estimates of  721 . 0 ˆ1 − = c  and  060 . 0 ˆ2 − = c  for 
the whole history of Dutch premier league football up to 1996. As this specification assumes a 
constant home effect for all teams, we also performed a likelihood ratio test for the overall 
significance of additional team specific home effects. The resulting test statistic amounted to 
28.9783 which corresponds to a p-value of 0.5703, so we do not have to reject our constant 
home effect-assumption.  
However, whereas the results of Table 1 reproduce a descriptive ranking, one should bear in 
mind that these results also rest on the assumption that the teams’ individual strength-
parameters did not change over an eleven years horizon. This supposition can surely be 
doubted since it is obviously challenged by usual transfer activities, rapidly rising operating 
revenues and ongoing commercialization of German premier league football. Thus, we de-
cided to base our performance models on a time varying team strength specification: For each 
season, 17 different strength parameters have been estimated, so that each of our performance 
models includes 187 individual team dummies.  
                                                 
1 Note the intrinsic merits of this kind of “all-time-ranking”. Whereas usual league schedules have to rank rele-
gated teams at the bottom as they rest on accumulated wins and draws, our estimates avoid this kind of bias (see, 
e.g. the Karlsruher SC which left the Bundesliga at the end of the 1997/1998 season. Yet, based on the relative 
club performance over six seasons, Karlsruhe has been ranked in front of 1860 München, which joined the 
Bundesliga in nine seasons of our estimation sample.   17 
5.2  Empirical Study: Variables 
All models contained indices of team heterogeneity and subgroup strength which were built 
according to a conception made by Gibson and Vermeulen (2003).  
 
The heterogeneity index is a relational measure which covers the amount of differences 
among team members. Our index of team heterogeneity rests on the following players’ 
characteristics: Tenure, overall tenure, age, nationality, experience and success. The tenure 
variable is measured as calendar days elapsed since the beginning of validity period of the 
current contract. However, as football professionals frequently change their employment 
status within the same division, an overall tenure variable, calculated as calendar days since 
beginning of the validity period of the first contract signed on this club, also considered those 
situations in which an actual employee returned to a team which he had already joined in the 
past. Age is measured in years whereas experience has been calculated as the number of 
Bundesliga matches a player had attended before the actual match. Finally, as a measure of a 
player’s overall success, we include the number of titles won by each player before the actual 
match (German championship and cup competition, as well as the European Champions 
League and the UEFA Cup competition). In addition to these metric variables, we also 
accounted for team heterogeneity in terms of nationality. 
Then, comparing each of these individual players’ characteristics xi with the corresponding 
ones of every active team mate in a particular match, we computed individual indices of over-
lap between every pair of players. For metric variables, this was done by computing ratios be-
tween the minimum and the maximum observation for any pair of players (i,j) (with 
overlapi,j=1 for max(xi,xj)=min (xi,xj)=0). However, some scaling seemed advisable for us: 
The age variable, for instance, approximately covers an interval between 18 and 40. So, its 
“plain” overlap ratio could only range between 0.45 and 1. Yet, as we would like to analyze 
homogeneity indices ranging from zero to one, our concrete metric of overlap was calculated 
according to the following equation (with minsample and maxsample denoting overall sample 
minima and maxima of variable x): 
sample
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j i
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j i
j i
j i
x x
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For nationality, we set our measure of overlap to one for pairs with the same nationality and 
to zero otherwise. The results of these individual comparisons were summed up over all six 
variables, yielding a team vector of pair-wise overlap metrics. As the mean of this vector 
aggregates individual comparison data to a team-specific scalar-index, this mean has been 
interpreted as our measure of total team homogeneity whereas team heterogeneity was 
calculated as its inverse (see table 2 for descriptive statistics of our heterogeneity measures of 
the performance analysis).  
 
Additionally, subgroup strength has been interpreted as the empirical standard distribution of 
a teams overlap vector. If all members of a team are dissimilar to each other to the same 
extent, there is only a low standard distribution of the overlap vector. However if some 
players are very similar to some other player but very dissimilar to another group of players 
the standard deviation of the total overlap pairs is high. 
------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------- 
 
In addition to heterogeneity and subgroup strength, the following variables were used as 
covariates in both the transition and the performance models. In the performance models all 
variables were constructed for the home and the away team seperately. All variables were 
updated at each observed match. 
Team tenure: The mean number of calendar days for which the players in the current match 
have continuously belonged to the club. Prior affiliation to the club was not considered. 
Team age: The mean of the current player’s age, in years. 
Team experience: The mean number of prior Bundesliga matches which the players have 
experienced before the current match.  
Team successes: The mean number of prior successes (wins of German championships, 
German cups, UEFA Cups or Champions League wins) of the current players. 
Coach tenure: The mean number of days for which the current coach has continuously 
belonged to the club. Prior affiliation to the club was not considered. 
Coach age: The age of the coach, measured in years.   19 
Coach experience: The number of prior Bundesliga matches which the current coach 
experienced as a coach. 
Coach’s player experience: The number of Bundesliga matches which the current coach 
experienced as a player. 
Coach successes: The number of the coach’s prior successes as a coach. 
Coach’s player successes: The number of the coach’s successes as a player. 
Rank: The team’s rank in the overall Bundesliga before the current match. (Bad teams have 
high ranks!). 
 
Further additional variables of the performance models were: 
Chain: A dummy variable indicating matches in which the observed team had chosen to apply 
the chain system. 
Change: Number of new players in the line-up for the current match compared to the line-up 
of the foregoing match. 
In order to test hypothesis H6 we interacted the chain variable with the heterogeneity variable. 
For exploratory reasons several other demographic variables have also been interacted with 
the chain variable. 
 
The transition analyses contained additional covariates: 
Duration: The number of matches before a team switches from the Libero system to the chain 
system -1 or the number of matches before a team switches from the chain system to the 
Libero system -1 respectively.  
Episode index: The number of the current episode in which the team is playing with the 
Libero or chain system. 
Time: Calendar time measured in days since the founding of the Bundesliga (05.09.1963). In 
order to test hypothesis H2, we interacted this variable with heterogeneity and for exploratory 
reasons with subgroup strength. 
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5.3  Empirical Study: Results  
Figure 2 shows the enormous rise in occurrences of the chain system at Bundesliga matches 
over the observation period. In the last season observed, 2002/2003, there was hardly a match 
to be found where at least one of the two opponents played with the old Libero system. Thus, 
the end of the observation period marks the almost total diffusion of the chain system. Figure 
2 also shows that the clubs differed in their tendency to switch between the two systems. Also 
the points in time from which on the clubs applied the chain system more or less continuously 
differs among the clubs.  
------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------- 
 
In figure 3 an example of the adoption pattern of the chain system is given for Bayern 
München, the top ranked club of table 1. The scatter plot exemplifies that clubs, after having 
adopted the chain system for the first time, did not play continuously with this system there-
after. In times when the chain system was still young and the amount of general experience 
with it was still low, the teams applied it only occasionally. Over time this pattern changed. 
Towards the end of the observation period the Libero system occurs only occasionally.  
------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the multivariate models of the adoption of the chain system. In 
the first model, only the main effects of team heterogeneity and subgroup strength are con-
sidered besides the duration variable and the other control variables. Neither the heterogeneity 
nor the subgroup strength variable exerts a significant influence on the rate of the chain sys-
tem adoption. However, this picture changes dramatically when the interactions of these var-
iables with time are included. Now the adoption propensity increases strongly with team 
heterogeneity and decreases strongly with subgroup strength. Over time the positive influence 
of heterogeneity and the negative effect of subgroup strength diminish significantly. Thus, the 
second model in table 3 gives ample support for hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. The institution-
alization of the chain system leads to a situation in which the demographic aspects of hetero-
geneity or subgroup strength no longer play a role with respect to the adoption propensity. 
These variables are mostly important at the beginning of the institutionalization process, when 
the chain system was new and really innovative.   21 
Moreover, the propensity to adopt the chain system decreases significantly with the number of 
matches a team has continuously played with the Libero system (Duration) and increases sig-
nificantly with (calendar) time. The latter effect represents the process of institutionalization 
of the chain system which was already depicted in figure 2. Furthermore, it is especially the 
more successful teams – the teams with low values on the rank variable – which adopt the 
chain system. Model II also displays that coaches are more reluctant to implement the chain 
system when they had a lot of successes during their careers as players. Probably this makes 
coaches believe that a system which made themselves successful when they were active foot-
ball players should work at later times as well. However this effect is only slightly significant. 
The other demographic variables do not exert a significant influence on the adoption rate. 
------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the models for the transition from the chain system back to the 
Libero system. As supposed in H4 the propensity to return to the Libero system increases sig-
nificantly with team heterogeneity. This result indicates that the higher volatility of heteroge-
neous teams makes them more prone to switch to the old system. Subgroup strength displays 
– as expected – a negative effect on this transition rate, which is not significant. Therefore H5 
cannot be supported.  
Again, the duration variable exerts a negative effect on the propensity of returning to the 
Libero system: Team tenure also has a significant negative effect. The longer the team 
members have played together the more likely it is that they stick to the new system once it 
has been adopted. Moreover, successful clubs have a lower tendency to return to the Libero 
system since the rank variable exerts a positive effect. This means that teams with high rank 
values (bad teams) are more prone to switch back to the traditional system. Finally team ex-
perience and coach experience lead to a slightly lower propensity of returning to the Libero 
system while prior successes of a coach lead to a slightly increased propensity to stick to the 
chain system. 
------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------- 
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Table 5 shows the results of the performance models. Recall that our ordered dependent vari-
able  ij D  ranges over integer values from one (home loss) to three (home win). Thus, a posi-
tive impact on the winning probabilities of the home team corresponds to positive parameter 
estimates. Consequently, judged by the estimates for model I which considers the main effects 
of our demographic variables, team heterogeneity significantly lowers the success probabil-
ities of the affected team: The positive coefficient of the away teams’ heterogeneity stands for 
a rise of the home teams’ winning probabilities with increasing away teams’ heterogeneity 
measures whereas the negative coefficient of home teams’ heterogeneity corresponds to a 
lowering of the home teams’ winning probabilities with increasing own heterogeneity. Yet, 
whereas team tenure and coaches’ player experience appear to have a significant positive im-
pact on their respective teams (the coaches’ negative tenure effect might be owed to the fact 
that, after a short period of grace at the beginning of their agency, coaches are usually fired in 
times of prolonged disappointments), we can not detect a global chain-effect at any reliable 
statistical significance level. Thus, our data set will not afford an ultimate conclusion about 
the dependencies between innovation-induced performance consequences and team heteroge-
neity up to this point.  
Regarding the remainder of the covariates it becomes evident that the performance of home 
teams increases with their rank and decreases in similar manner with the opponent’s rank. 
This effect controls for the mean-reversion in league sports: Consider a team winning its first 
matches at the beginning of a season. As a result, the team might be ranked at position one. 
Yet, some of the matches won by our hypothetical team might just have been good luck as the 
German Bundesliga never saw any team beating all of its competitors. Thus, such a run of 
luck (which indeed is quite common to the Bundesliga) is likely to end in the near future. 
 
The results for model II, which allows for additional interaction effects between the chain 
dummy and the remaining covariates of model I (except team line-up changes and coach 
tenure) are of interest on their own. Hypothesis H6 can not be supported by these results as 
we are not able to provide evidence for an additional heterogeneity-chain interaction. Instead 
of that, we detect a significant negative interaction effect of team tenure with the chain sys-
tem. Moreover, away teams practicing the chain system appear additionally affected by team 
age (negative effect) as well as the coaches’ former success (positive effect).  
------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
-------------------------   23 
6 Discussion 
We conducted this study on the interplay of aspects of organizational demography and insti-
tutional change because we felt that previous investigations on the adoption of institutional-
ized practices neglected the influence of differences among organizational members. Our ana-
lysis with data on German Bundesliga teams showed that in fact heterogeneity of teams is an 
important aspect in influencing the willingness of a club to adapt to institutional develop-
ments. Heterogeneous teams have a higher propensity to switch from the Libero system to the 
chain-defense system at times when the chain system was new and innovative, thus showing 
that they are less reluctant to adopt an element of team play which is in the process of be-
coming institutionalized. However, heterogeneity of teams loses its influence on the adoption 
rate as this process moves on. Thus, the stronger the institutional pressure on Bundesliga 
teams, the less important the role of homogeneity or heterogeneity of teams with respect to 
the adoption probability.  
Subgroup strength, which accounts for the fact that some team members can be very similar 
to a certain fraction of players but very dissimilar to other fractions, displays parallel effects. 
The within subgroup homogeneity leads to a greater resistance to change and thus to a lower 
propensity to adopt the newly developed defense system at the beginning of the institutionali-
zation process. However, this reluctance of teams with high levels of subgroup strength 
diminishes over time since the institutionalization process also forces these teams to adopt the 
chain system.  
Moreover, the greater volatility of heterogeneous teams makes them more likely to return to 
the traditional Libero system after they have adopted the chain system. The reasons for a 
return to the “old” Libero system and thus to a deviation from the institutionalized expec-
tations could e.g. be the dissatisfaction of players or the conviction that some opponents can 
be better faced with the traditional system. We hypothesized that the greater within subgroup 
homogeneity of teams with high levels of subgroup strength should lead to negative effect of 
subgroup strength on the rate of returning to the Libero system. While the effect turned out to 
be negative the statistical significance did not suffice to get support for this hypothesis. As a 
consequence, heterogeneity turned out to be more influential on the rate of returning to the 
“anti-institutional” system than subgroup strength.   24 
Finally we found that heterogeneous teams had no performance disadvantages when applying 
the chain system which runs counter our hypothesis. Thus, it is not the case that homogeneous 
teams are more capable of exerting the innovation than heterogeneous teams. We expected 
such an effect since we thought that although homogeneity leads to reluctance to the adoption 
of an innovation, it should also lead to better understanding of team mates actions once the 
new system has been implemented. However, we found that the mean tenure of the team 
members as well as the team member’s mean age lead to such performance disadvantages 
when the new system is applied. Older teams and teams whose members which play a long 
time together obviously find it harder to adapt to the new playing system. On the other hand, 
prior successes of the coach when he was a player himself lead to performance advantages 
when the chain system is applied. Perhaps, these coaches can better put themselves in the 
position of the players in the process of adopting a new playing system than other coaches. 
We strongly believe that the analysis of organizational demography and the adoption and exe-
cution of innovations is not only relevant for Bundesliga football teams. Other smaller organi-
zations or profit centres of companies whose team structures are comparable to those of foot-
ball teams should exhibit similar processes. Thus, we think that there is an ample new field 
within organizational research which could be explored in the future. 
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Appendix: Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: German Bundesliga, Overall Club Ranking 1993–2003 
 
Club Coefficient  Std.  Error  Z-Statistic  p-Value 
Bayern München  0.5525  0.0838  6.5973  0.0000 
Borussia Dortmund  0.3120  0.0825  3.7836  0.0002 
Bayer Leverkusen  0.2546  0.0819  3.1069  0.0019 
Hertha BSC Berlin  0.1921  0.1000  1.9211  0.0547 
1. FC Kaiserslautern  0.1570  0.0843  1.8617  0.0626 
Werder Bremen  0.1220  0.0820  1.4876  0.1369 
FC Schalke 04  0.0493  0.0813  0.6057  0.5447 
VfB Stuttgart  0.0385  0.0817  0.4714  0.6373 
Karlsruher SC  0.0358  0.0982  0.3644  0.7156 
VfL Wolfsburg  0.0222  0.0986  0.2248  0.8221 
TSV 1860 München  -0.0432  0.0865  -0.4988  0.6179 
Hannover 96  -0.1281  0.2055  -0.6234  0.5330 
Spvgg Unterhaching  -0.1747  0.1524  -1.1460  0.2518 
Mönchengladbach -0.1003  0.0867  -1.1580  0.2469 
Eintracht Frankfurt  -0.1238  0.0939  -1.3182  0.1874 
Hansa Rostock  -0.1328  0.0899  -1.4777  0.1395 
SSV Ulm 1846  -0.3140  0.2103  -1.4935  0.1353 
SC Freiburg  -0.1365  0.0899  -1.5195  0.1286 
Fortuna Düsseldorf  -0.2747  0.1505  -1.8249  0.0680 
MSV Duisburg  -0.2087  0.0987  -2.1142  0.0345 
1. FC Köln  -0.1975  0.0904  -2.1852  0.0289 
FC Saarbrücken  -0.4921  0.2043  -2.4087  0.0160 
Union Cottbus  -0.3537  0.1307  -2.7067  0.0068 
Wattenscheid 09  -0.4198  0.1541  -2.7247  0.0064 
Arminia Bielefeld  -0.3237  0.1149  -2.8168  0.0049 
VfL Bochum  -0.2792  0.0944  -2.9576  0.0031 
Dynamo Dresden  -0.3937  0.1278  -3.0815  0.0021 
1. FC Nürnberg  -0.3415  0.1063  -3.2120  0.0013 
VfB Leipzig  -0.8030  0.2180  -3.6832  0.0002 
Bayer Uerdingen  -0.4858  0.1296  -3.7501  0.0002 
FC St. Pauli  -0.4929  0.1299  -3.7940  0.0001 
C1 -0.7294  0.0243  -30.0236  0.0000 
C2 0.0461  0.0221  2.0866  0.0369 
 
Note: Performance Measured in Relation to Hamburger SV 
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Table 2.a: Heterogeneity (Home Teams) - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Season Mean  Median  Max Min.  Std.  Dev.  Obs. 
1993 0.2333  0.2311  0.2817  0.1843  0.0202  306 
1994 0.2340  0.2331  0.2859  0.1820  0.0219  306 
1995 0.2374  0.2385  0.2815  0.1934  0.0209  306 
1996 0.2372  0.2382  0.2913  0.1892  0.0198  306 
1997 0.2427  0.2424  0.3011  0.2017  0.0198  306 
1998 0.2520  0.2496  0.3024  0.2134  0.0190  306 
1999 0.2512  0.2489  0.2985  0.2087  0.0180  306 
2000 0.2519  0.2465  0.3130  0.2057  0.0225  306 
2001 0.2525  0.2469  0.3163  0.2089  0.0213  306 
2002 0.2534  0.2517  0.3093  0.2060  0.0192  306 
2003 0.2529  0.2514  0.2929  0.2245  0.0148  306 
Whole Sample  0.2453  0.2447  0.3163  0.1820  0.0214  3366 
 
 
Table 2.b: Heterogeneity (Away Team) - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Season Mean  Median  Max Min.  Std.  Dev.  Obs. 
1993 0.2330  0.2299  0.2792  0.1891  0.0194  306 
1994 0.2333  0.2337  0.2832  0.1818  0.0216  306 
1995 0.2366  0.2364  0.2845  0.1900  0.0202  306 
1996 0.2367  0.2366  0.2868  0.1900  0.0201  306 
1997 0.2427  0.2427  0.3000  0.2009  0.0197  306 
1998 0.2517  0.2503  0.3055  0.2114  0.0188  306 
1999 0.2508  0.2494  0.3012  0.2042  0.0181  306 
2000 0.2518  0.2471  0.3065  0.2078  0.0221  306 
2001 0.2515  0.2461  0.3079  0.2024  0.0209  306 
2002 0.2533  0.2517  0.3136  0.2048  0.0197  306 
2003 0.2518  0.2490  0.2944  0.2198  0.0148  306 
Whole Sample  0.2448  0.2443  0.3136  0.1818  0.0212  3366 
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Table 3: Exponential Models of the Adoption of the Chain System 
 
  Model I  Model II 
Variable  Coefficient  p-Value  Coefficient  p-Value 
Duration -0.0242  0.000  -0.0232  0.000 
Heterogeneity 3.4414  0.358  161.9391  0.001 
Heterogeneity*Time      -0.0123  0.001 
Subgroup strength  0.0764  0.900  -27.2859  0.000 
Subgroup strength*Time      0.0021  0.000 
Team tenure  0.0002  0.272  0.0003  0.119 
Team age  0.0299  0.611  0.2930  0.619 
Team experience  -0.0018  0.407  -0.0024  0.268 
Team successes  0.0229  0.846  -0.0112  0.924 
Coach tenure  -0.0001  0.207  -0.0000  0.832 
Coach age  -0.0113  0.302  -0.0081  0.470 
Coach experience  -0.0000  0.993  -0.0005  0.492 
Coach’s player experience  0.0004  0.357  0.0002  0.671 
Coach successes  -0.0095  0.880  0.0169  0.792 
Coach’s player successes  -0.0698  0.120  -0.0754  0.093 
Rank -0.0513  0.000  -0.0508  0.000 
Episode index  0.0102  0.238  0.0110  0.225 
Time 0.0007  0.000  0.0020  0.007 
Constant -10.8089  0.000  -28.4647  0.002 
Log Likelihood  -513.432    -506.2099   
LR Statistic  375.42  0.000  390.29  0.000 
Number of events  371    371   
Number of observations  3554    3554   
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Table 4: Exponential Model for Returning to the Libero System 
 
Variable  Coefficient  p-Value 
Duration -0.0376  0.000 
Heterogeneity 7.5739  0.037 
Subgroup strength  -0.4497  0.461 
Team tenure  -0.0008  0.000 
Team age  0.0282  0.646 
Team experience  0.0039  0.074 
Team successes  0.1718  0.170 
Coach tenure  0.0000  0.723 
Coach age  -0.0061  0.610 
Coach experience  0.0012  0.097 
Coach’s player experience  0.0005  0.271 
Coach successes  -0.1097  0.096 
Coach’s player successes  -0.0170  0.719 
Rank 0.0292  0.012 
Episode index  -0.0070  0.477 
Time -0.0005  0.000 
Constant 2.8475  0.157 
Log Likelihood  -502.2956   
LR Statistic  204.9  0.000 
Number of events  360   
Number of observations  2687   
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Table 5: Results for the Performance Models 
 
  Model I  Model II 
 
Variable Coefficient  p-Value  Coefficient p-Value 
Heterogeneity -7.2812  0.0004  -8.3522  0.0006 
Heterogeneity (Away Team)  5.6995  0.0055  4.8451  0.0464 
Team Tenure  0.0004  0.0016  0.0006  0.0001 
Team Tenure (Away Team)  -0.0003  0.0217  -0.0005  0.0011 
Coach Tenure  -0.0002  0.0004  -0.0002  0.0009 
Coach Tenure (Away Team)  0.0003  0.0000  0.0002  0.0001 
Coach’s Player Exp.  0.0009  0.0027  0.0007  0.0153 
Coach’s Player Exp. (Away Team)  -0.0007  0.0208  -0.0004  0.1615 
Rank 0.0570  0.0000  0.0569  0.0000 
Rank (Away Team)  -0.0585  0.0000  -0.0590  0.0000 
Changes -0.0383  0.0213  -0.0393  0.0184 
Changes (Away Team)  0.0257  0.1177  0.0267  0.1057 
Chain -0.0540  0.3555  0.4224  0.7149 
Chain (Away Team)  0.0814  0.1600  -2.7601  0.0150 
Chain*Heterogeneity      3.0294  0.2668 
Chain*Heterogeneity (Away Team)      1.3194  0.6230 
Chain*Tenure      -0.0003  0.1050 
Chain*Tenure (Away Team)      0.0003  0.0763 
Chain*Age      -0.0335  0.3711 
Chain*Age (Away Team)      0.0822  0.0259 
Chain* Coach’s Player Success      0.0289  0.2536 
Chain* Coach’s Player Success (A.T.)      -0.0609  0.0123 
C1 -1.0216  0.0070  -1.4729  0.0028 
C2 -0.1804  0.6336  -0.6280  0.2023 
Log Likelihood  -3134.2382    -3124.1151   
LR Statistic  719.8963  0.0000  740.1425  0.0000 
No. of Parameters  203    211   
No. of Observations  3328    3328   
 
 
 
Note: The Results for Additional 187 Individual Strength Estimators have been Omitted.  33 
Figure 1: Empirical Distribution of the Goal difference 
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Figure 2: Cumulated Individual Adoption Patterns 1993-2003 
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Note: Due to the Relegation System, 1. FC Kaiserslautern was not Observed in 1996/1997. 
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Figure 3: Exemplary Adoption Pattern over the Whole Sample Period 
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